| **Indicator** | **Options** | **Value** | **Reasoning** | **References** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Alternative economic opportunities | Increase | 1 | Having alternative economic opportunities provides users with an alternative source of income and can compensate forgone profits from implementing a reserve. With no alternative economic opportunities, this might be a source of instability for the community. | [1][2] |
| Stable / Decrease | -1 |
| Access to the fishery | TURF | 1 | TURFs promote stewardship of marine resources | [3][4] |
| Permits | 1 | Fishing permits (or licenses) create entry restrictions, which can limit the total amount of effort applied to the stock | [5] |
| Quotas for the whole fishery | 1 | Total allowable catches and Individual Transferable Quotas cap total catches at a maximum. | [6] |
| Individual Quotas | 1 |
| Open Access | -1 | The fishery is unrestricted. This can lead to long-term depletion of stocks. |
| Number of fishers | Lower / Stable | 1 | Maintaining or decreasing the number of fishers (a proxy for fishing effort) might help stabilize fishing effort. An increased number of fishers with reduced fishing ground might lead to an overall decrease in per capita income. |  |
| Higher | -1 |
| Legal recognition of reserve | Yes | 1 | Legal recognition of the reserve increases threat of punishment, which can de-incentivize illegal fishing. | [7] |
| No | -1 |
| Degree of illegal harvesting | Lower | 1 | Illegal fishing decreases biophysical indicators (e.g. biomass, density), and therefore, socioeconomic indicators (i.e. landings and income from landings). |
| Higher | -1 |
| Management plan | Yes | 1 | There is a better chance that members will be aware of the rules and limits of the reserve. Therefore, it is more likely that rules will be obeyed. |
| No | -1 | Members will not be aware of the rules and limits of the reserve. Therefore, it is less likely that rules will be obeyed. |
| Reserve enforcement | Patrol boats | 1 | Any means of reserve enforcement is valid. Enforcing your reserve will allow you to keep illegal fishing to the limits. |
| Sighting from land | 1 |
| AIS | 1 |
| Government | 1 |
| Community | 1 |
| Size of reserve | Smaller than home range | -1 | It is important that reserves can match the home range of the target species | [8] |
| Same or larger than home range | 1 |
| Membership to fisher organizations | Yes | 1 | Provides a platform for communication and cooperation. Not belonging to a group might reduce the capacity of cooperation and participation. | [9][10] |
| No | -1 |
| Representation | High | 1 | A participatory process in which diverse stakeholders are included fosters communication and anticipates possible issues. At the same time, an inclusive process secures buy-in from the users, which can lead to more effective interventions. | [1][2] |
| Low | -1 |
| Internal Regulation | Yes | 1 | An organization's internal set of rules are often stricter than formally recognized regulations and tailored to meet internal management objectives. Additionally, they tend to have support from all the community and are thoroughly enforced. |  |
| No | -1 |
| Perceived Effectiveness | Yes | 1 | If members of the fisheries organizations perceive that the reserves help them meet stated objectives, then they will be more likely to comply with the rules of the no-take area. | [2] |
| No | -1 |

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